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THE PLACE OF TREATIES IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT

EUSTACE CHIKERE AZUBUIKE
SJD CANIDATE, GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW

INTRODUCTION
In the past, economic relations between a national of a State and a
foreign State were subject to the general law regulating the protection of
aliens, which was more of a form of international diplomacy than a
statutory protection.1 It was thought that a State had a right to protect its
nationals in another State.2 On its own, however, this duty did not confer
an incidental right to the nationals. Thus, a basic feature of this era was
the discretion of a State to choose whether or not to bring claims on
behalf of its citizens.3 Even when a State did espouse such claims, there
was no guarantee that whatever accrued from the claims belonged to or
would go to the nationals, since there was a legal fiction that when a
wrong was committed against the national of a State, it was actually

1. See Barnali Choudhury, International Investment Law As a Global Public Good, 4 (stating
that; “[p]rior to the twentieth century, standards for the protection of foreign investors and foreign
investments were developed primarily through the process of diplomatic protection.”), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2181414.
2. See A.M.H. VERMEER-KUNZLI, THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS BY MEANS
OF DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION, 3 (2007); Craig Forcese, Shelter from the Storm: Rethinking
Diplomatic Protection of Dual Nationals in Modern International Law, 37 GEO. WASH. INT’L L.
REV. 469, 471- 472 (2005).
3. See Alberto Alvarez-Jimenez, Foreign Investors, Diplomatic Protection and the
International Court of Justice’s Decision on Preliminary Objections in the Diallo Case, 33 N.C. J.
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 437, 438 (2008).
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committed against the State.4 The option aliens had was to persuade their
home States to espouse their claims directly with the host States. This
arrangement could not offer adequate protection to the investments of
aliens in the host State, because it could leave the aliens with little or no
avenue for the recovery of damages for injury.5
However, with the passage of time, and as economic transactions
between States expanded, the time was ripe for States to conclude
treaties that would regulate the investments of its nationals in another
State. Treaties regulating foreign investment were all the more necessary
because international law had not developed a generally acceptable norm
governing foreign investments. This development, in brief, explains the
history of international investment treaties. Presently, there is a
proliferation of foreign investment treaties. This proliferation has caused
treaties to assume much more significance in international investment
law. This paper presents the significance of treaties to international
investments. It contends that there is a hierarchy of sources of
international law and that treaties occupy a central place among these
sources. It also posits that increased certainty is needed to foster
international investment, and use of multilateral treaties could go a long
way in achieving this goal.
This paper is divided into seven parts. Part 1 traces the history of foreign
investment treaties and provides the factors that led to the emergence of
the current investment regime. Part 2 discusses the significance of
treaties in the vexed question of whether or not there is a hierarchy of
international law sources. Part 3 examines treaty-making in the current
international investment regime – visiting the argument about whether or
not the provisions of investment treaties have ripened into customary
international law, highlighting the dominance of bilateral investment
treaties over multilateral investment treaties, offering explanation for the
near absence of multilateral investment treaties in the current investment
treaty regime, and noting the legitimacy problem that arises from
inconsistent decisions of arbitral tribunals. The general bindingness of
treaties under international law is explored in Part 4, while Part 5
considers the exceptions to the rule that treaties are binding on the
parties. Part 6 focuses on the benefits and criticisms of Investment
Treaties. This paper concludes that international investment treaties have

4. Kate Miles, International Investment Law: Origins, Imperialism and Conceptualizing the
Environment, 21 COLO. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 15 (2010); David J. Bederman, State-to-State
Espousal of Human Rights Claims, 1 Va. J. Int’l L. Online 3, 4-5 (2011).
5. Id, at 4-5.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol19/iss1/9

2

Azubuike: Treaties in International Investment

2013]

TREATIES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT

157

brought some much-needed certainty to the terms regulating the
investment relations between the foreign investor and the host State.
I.

THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
TREATIES

The history of international investment6 does not coincide with the
history of investment treaties,7 although both of them have links to
general principles of international law.8 Prior to the Second World War,
the protection of international investment was not a major concern of
international law.9 Investments in the colonies that were taken over by
the imperial powers had been given sufficient protection by the
imperialists because of the stake the imperial powers had in them.10
Before this time and during the ancient era,11 the status of aliens in the
territory of another State and the protection afforded to their investments
was at a very low ebb.12 However, at present, the situation has witnessed
some remarkable changes. This section explores the evolution of these
changes.
International investment treaties were necessary for States to protect their
nationals doing business in foreign States. At the most fundamental level
of international law, there is no obligation of a State to admit the
nationals of another State to its territory in the absence of any agreement
to the contrary.13 However, when a national of a State is admitted by
another State, the treatment given to the alien by the host State must
conform to some recognized standard. Such a standard is neither better
nor worse than that applicable to local nationals.14 Additionally, if an
alien is injured by the actions of the host State, then the alien's State can
6. In this work “international investment” and “foreign investment” are used interchangeably.
7. See Asha Kaushal, Revisiting History: How the Past Matters for the Present Backlash
Against the Foreign Investment Regime, 50 HARV. INT'L L. J. 491, 499 (2009) (stating that the
history of the one dates back in time much further than the other). This is understandable since
international investment treaties originated from international investment. But both of them are not
mutually exclusive.
8. See Joshua Robbins, The Emergence of Positive Obligations in Bilateral Investment
Treaties, 13 MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 403, 409 (2006) (founding the origin of foreign
investment treaty rules in general international law principles). The same should be applicable to
rules of international investment. But see Christopher M. Ryan, Discerning the Compliance
Calculus: Why States Comply With International Investment Law, 38 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 63,
66 (2009) (arguing that “[i]nternational investment law fundamentally differs from traditional or
customary forms of international law in several respects”).
9. See M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 19 (2010).
10. Id.
11. The “ancient era” refers to the period before the Second World War.
12. See ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUIS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT
TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 3 (2009).
13. See DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1051 (2009).
14. Id.
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bring a claim on behalf of the alien against the host State responsible for
the injury.15 It is against this backdrop that international investment
treaties developed.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, economic relations
between States allowed the use of diplomatic protection by States to
espouse the claims of their nationals in another State.16 When States were
desirous of safeguarding the interests of their nationals’ abroad, they
could use all the means at their disposal.17 Thus, gunboat diplomacy was
readily resorted to by more powerful States in order to exert favorable
treatment from weaker States in their economic dealings18 or to recover
debts being owed them or their nationals.19 Although this form of
diplomatic protection was not generally prohibited under then-existing
international law, its use soon became abused by States.20 The abuse was
evident in the forceful collection of debt from Latin American States by
European naval forces where, for instance, there was naval intervention
of Great Britain, Germany, and Italy in Venezuela in 1902.21 Similarly,
on several occasions in the twentieth century, the United States
forcefully intervened in Latin America.22 Thus, the need to get rid of
gunboat diplomacy and its attendant problems was the impetus for the
development of international investment treaties.23
From the ancient era to the World War II era, there were no generally
accepted or institutionalized rules regulating investment between States.
Traditional international law was depended on to regulate international
investment. Nonetheless, as the advent of gunboat diplomacy illustrates,
traditional international law was not adequately tooled for this task.24
Thus, the evolution of the modern form of investment law can be traced
15. Id., at 1052.
16. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 12, at 2, 9.
17. Id., at 2, 9
18. Gunboat diplomacy is “the use or threat of limited naval force, otherwise than as an act of
war, in order to secure advantage or to avert loss, either in furtherance of an international dispute or
else against foreign nationals within the territory or the jurisdiction of their own state.” JAMES
CABLE, GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY, 1919-1991: POLITICAL APPLICATIONS OF LIMITED NAVAL FORCE 14
(3d ed. 1994).
19. See Bernard Kishoiyian, The Utility of Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Formulation of
Customary International Law, 14 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 327, 329 (1994).
20. See NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 12, at 8, 9.
21. See Kishoiyian, supra note 19, at 329. It is recorded that “between 1820 and 1914, Great
Britain intervened in Latin America at least forty times to enforce British claims for injuries to its
nationals and to restore order and protect property”. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 12, at 9.
22. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment Agreements, 12
U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 157, 160-161 (2005).
23. See Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing
Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1525 (2005).
24. See Ryan, supra note 8, at 68.
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through the post World War II reconstruction era, which was caused by
the economic depression.25
At this point, customary international law still did not adequately
regulate international investment. First, there was no consensus as to
what law governed the treatment of foreign investment.26 While
developed States had largely embraced the role of international law in
regulating how foreign nationals should be treated and accepted that
international law should regulate the treatment of their foreign
investments, developing States were averse to the expansion of
international law into areas thought to be the exclusive province of
domestic law.27
Second, the principles that were in existence then were devoid of clarity
and were thus subject to differing interpretations. Although there were
indications that customary international law, as well as many friendship,
commerce, and navigation treaties, required compensation for the
nationalization or expropriation of foreign investments, there were no
clear principles governing how compensation should be determined.28
While it seemed customary international law required the payment of full
compensation by the expropriating State,29 developing States roundly
disagreed with this standard. They saw it as a violation of their
sovereignty30 and argued for the standard of appropriate compensation.31
25. See DOAK BISHOP ET AL., FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES: CASES, MATERIALS AND
COMMENTARY 1-2 (2005).
26. See Stephen M. Schwebel, The Influence of Bilateral Investment Treaties on Customary
International Law, 98 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 27, 27 (2004).
27. Id., at 27
28. See Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation
of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT'L L. J. 67, 68-69 (2005).
29. Developed states consistently espoused a standard of “full compensation,” also referred to
as the Hull Formula, which is defined as prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. See CME
Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, Final Award, at 115, UNCITRAL Arbitration (March 14,
2003), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/CME-2003-Final_002.pdf. See also Factory at
Chorzow (Ger. v. Pol.), Claim for Indemnity, Merits, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17 (Sept. 13),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/serie_A/A_17/54_Usine_de_Chorzow_Fond_Arret.pdf, and 3
GREEN H. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 658-59 (1942).
30. See Gloria Sandrino, The NAFTA Investment Chapter and Foreign Direct Investment in
Mexico: A Third World Perspective, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 259, 318 (1994).
31. Appropriate compensation seems to have no generally accepted definition. However, it is
considered as an “attempt to bridge differences between developed and developing states.” OECD
Directorate Fin. & Enter. Affairs, “Indirect Expropriation” and the “Right to Regulate” in
International Investment Law, at 2 n. 1, Working Papers Int’l Inv. No. 2004/4, (2004), available at
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/internationalinvestmentagreements/33776546.pdf. Sornarajah argues
that appropriate compensation is a flexible standard that could range from full compensation to even
no compensation at all depending on the circumstances. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 9, at 446.
While appropriate compensation may give states and arbitrators a wide latitude of discretion and
flexibility, Sornarajah’s incorporation of full compensation into appropriate compensation may raise
some objection. Thus, according to Lauterpacht, appropriate compensation implied something less
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Even though appropriate compensation does not have a generally
accepted definition, it appears the developing States agitated for it,
because it might involve only the payment of the market value of the
foreign investment without regard to or addition of the future profits the
investment would have generated. Full compensation, which the
developing States would not accept, has sometimes included notions of
future profits which the investment would have made as a going concern
if the expropriation had not taken place.32
The European States, which had carried out economic relations among
themselves on a reciprocal basis, wanted to extend the standards under
which those relations had thrived to their relations with the nonEuropean States.33 Thus, they attempted to introduce the minimum
standards of treatment that reflected their notion of “civilized states
standard,”34 apparently to secure a better protection of their investment in
non-European States. Not unexpectedly, such an attempt was not
welcomed by these other States, as it was an imposition of Eurocentric
ideology on them.35 The disagreement between the developed and the
developing States on the standard of protection of foreign investment led
to the adoption of the United Nations Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States in 1974, which provided for the right of every State to
expropriate foreign investment and endorsed the payment of appropriate
compensation.36

than full compensation. See Eli Lauterpacht, Issues of Compensation and Nationality in the Taking
of Energy Investment, 8 JOURNAL OF ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 241, 249 (1990).
32. See Metalclad v. Mexico (2001) 5 ICSID Reports, 209.
33. See Miles, supra note 4, at 3.
34. “Civilized states standard” seems to incorporate the full compensation standard advocated
by the developed states. See Ahmad Ali Ghouri, The Evolution of Bilateral Investment Treaties,
Investment Treaty Arbitration and International Investment Law, 14 INT’L ARB. L. R. (Issue 6) 191
(2011).
35. The developing countries had advocated that foreign investment should be subject to the
regulation of the host state. This position was articulated in the Calvo Clause, which was popularized
by an Argentine diplomat, Carlos Calvo. The Calvo Clause is a contractual stipulation that contracts
between Latin American governments and foreigners doing business in Latin American states should
be regulated by the laws of the host states, and that unless the legal remedies provided by the host
states have been exhausted, the foreigners’ home governments cannot offer them diplomatic
protection . The Calvo Clause prescribes that foreigners be entitled only to the same standard of
treatment that is given to nationals. See generally Denise Manning-Cabrol, The Imminent Death of
the Calvo Clause and the Rebirth of the Calvo Principle: Equality of National and Foreign Investors,
26 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 1169 (1995) LUIS M. DRAGO, LA REPUBLICA ARGENTINA Y EL
CASO DE VENEZUELA (1903) and Luis M. Drago, State Loans in their Relation to International
Policy, 1 AM. J. INT’L L. 692 (1907). See also K. Lipstein, The Place of the Calvo Clause in
International Law, 22 B.Y. INT’L L. (Royal Institute of International Affairs) 130 (1945).
36. See G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974) (particularly Art. 2).
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It was in view of these shortcomings that States, especially capital
exporting States, began charting a new course to create rules for the
protection of foreign investments on both bilateral and multilateral
levels. On the multilateral level, there were efforts to establish the
Havana Charter of 1948.37 The purpose of the Havana Charter was to
create a regulatory body, the International Trade Organization, which
would regulate international trade and make rules on international
investments.38 However, the Havana Charter failed to receive general
ratification by States, leading to its failure.39 There were similar efforts to
establish the International Chamber of Commerce's International Code of
Fair Treatment for Foreign Investment (1949),40 the Abs-Shawcross
Convention (1959),41 and the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) Draft Convention on the Protection of
Foreign Property (1967).42 While these efforts did not come to fruition,
they gave impetus to the subsequent development of investment
treaties.43
The drive towards the creation of more beneficial international
investment relationships achieved huge success in the late 1950s,
especially on the European axis where Germany and Pakistan signed
what is considered the first bilateral investment treaty in 1959.44 This
37. See Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, Mar. 24, 1948, U.N. Doc.
E/CONF.2/78 (hereinafter Havana Charter) available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_
e/legal_e/havana_e.pdf.
38. There were few provisions on investment in the final draft of the Havana Charter, and
states could not come to an agreement as to the standard of protection to be given to international
investments. In the end, the Havana Charter failed as a result of the failure of the United States
Senate to ratify it under Truman administration. See NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 12, at 1920; Christoph T. Feddersen, Focusing on Substantive Law in International Economic Relations: The
Public Morals of GATT's Article XX(a) and “Conventional” Rules of Interpretation, 7 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 75, 80-81 (1998).
39. See generally ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE
DIPLOMACY (2. ed. 1990) and JOHN JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (2d. ed. 1997) and
William Diebold, Jr., The End of the ITO, Princeton Essays in International Finance, No. 16, (1952).
40. See generally Franziska Tschofen, Multilateral Approaches to the Treatment of Foreign
Investment, 7 ICSID REV.—FOREIGN INV. L. J. (No. 2) 384, 385- 386 (1992).
41. Herman Abs & Hartley Shawcross, Draft Convention of Investments Abroad (AbsShawcross Draft Convention), (Apr. 1959) in Note, The proposed convention to protect private
foreign investment: a round table, 9 J. PUB. L. (presently EMORY LAW JOURNAL) 116 (1960).
42. OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, Oct. 12, 1967, 7 I.L.M.
117 (1962).
43. See NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 12, at 30 (noting that, “although the 1967 Draft
OECD Convention failed to gain sufficient support among OECD countries for adoption as a
multilateral convention, its substantive provisions have served as an important model for bilateral
investment treaties”).
44. See Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, F.R.G.-P, Nov. 25, 1959, 24
U.N.T.S 1963, and Ryan, supra note 8, at 72. That the 1959 treaty between Germany and Pakistan
was the first bilateral treaty is true to the extent that it was the first that exclusively dealt with
investment-related issues independent of other commercial matters, as there were before the
conclusion of that treaty other treaties, such as the Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and
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bilateral investment treaty was followed by Switzerland in 1961, the
Netherlands in 1963, Italy and the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union
in 1964, Sweden and Denmark in 1965, Norway in 1966, France in 1972,
the United Kingdom in 1975, Austria in 1976, and Japan in 1977.45 By
1977, European countries had concluded approximately 130 bilateral
investment treaties with many developing countries.46 Following the
European example, the United States initiated its own bilateral
investment treaty program in 1981.47 This program was so aggressive
that within 25 years, it had concluded about 45 bilateral investment
treaties with developing countries.48
With the emergence of new economies and the end of communism, by
the late 1980s, the new economies of Eastern and Central Europe, and
some Latin American, African, and Asian countries needed sources of
capital to finance their developmental projects.49 This goal was
achievable by means of bilateral investment treaties with developed
countries. At the end of 1988, about 309 bilateral treaties had been
concluded,50 which rose to at least 1,700 by 1998.51 By 2002, no less than
2,181 treaties were in force.52 At present, there are about 3,000 bilateral
investment treaties concluded between States.53 Although those treaties
are often between a developed country and a developing country,54 in

Navigation, which, apart from their provisions on trade in goods and freedom of navigation, also
provided for investment- related guarantees. See Jason Webb Yackee, Conceptual Difficulties in the
Empirical Study of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 33 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 405, 436-437 (2008).
45. See NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 12, at 42- 43.
46. See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES FOR
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 13-16 (1977).
47. See Pamela Gann, The U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty Program, 21 STAN. J. INT'L L. 373
(1985).
48. See U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty Program Fact Sheet (Sept. 15,
2004), http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/bit/117402.htm.
49. See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 28, at 74.
50. See Athena Pappas, References on Bilateral Investment Treaties, 4 ICSID REV.—FOREIGN
INV. L.J. 189, 194- 203 (1989).
51. See UNCTAD, Trends in International Investment Agreements: An Overview 22 fig. 2,
U.N. Doc. No. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/13 (1999); UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Mid
1990's (1998). For more information on the development of bilateral investment treaties, see United
Nations Center on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC), Bilateral Investment Treaties (1988);
UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959- 1999, U.N. Doc. No. UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2 (2000).
52. See UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003: FDI Policies for Development: National
and International Perspectives, 89, U.N. Doc. No. UNCTAD/WIR/2003 (Sept. 2003).
53. See Jeswald Salacuse, The Emerging Global Regime for Investment, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J.
427, 428 (2010).
54. See Yackee, supra note 44, at 405.
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recent times there have been bilateral investment treaties concluded
between developing States.55
The development of investment treaty law has taken some prominence in
international law. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the place of
treaties in the hierarchy of international law sources.
II.

TREATIES AND THE HIERARCHY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW SOURCES

The hierarchy of law sources assumes great importance in most
municipalities because it resolves conflicts between norms.56 In many of
the States that operate under a written constitution, not only are laws
ordered in a hierarchy,57 but there is also a provision stating that the
constitution shall prevail over any other law in case of a conflict.58
Usually, written law overrides unwritten law, while political norm
trumps over legal norms.59 This section will apply the concept of
hierarchy to international law.
While the existence of hierarchy of laws in domestic legal systems may
not be contested, there has been a long debate over hierarchy of sources
of international law. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) is considered as a provision on the sources of
international law.60 The order in which the sources are listed can be
55. See Franck, supra note 23, at 1527-28; Glen Kelley, Multilateral Investment Treaties: A
Balanced Approach to Multinational Corporations, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L., 483, 488
(2001).
56. See Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 291
(2006).
57. E.g., art. 11 of the Constitution of Ghana provides in part that: “[t]he laws of Ghana shall
comprise (a) this Constitution; (b) enactments made by or under the authority of the Parliament
established by this Constitution; (c) any Orders, Rules and Regulations made by any person or
authority under a power conferred by this Constitution; (d) the existing law; and (e) the common
law” See Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, May 8, 1992, art. 11, available at
http://www.politicsresources.net/docs/ghanaconst.pdf.
58. E.g., Article 1(2) of the Constitution of Ghana provides that: “[t]he Constitution shall be
the supreme law of Ghana and any other law found to be inconsistent with any provision of this
Constitution should, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void.” Id., art. 1(2). Also, Section 1 of the
Constitution of Nigeria contains similar provision. See Constitution of the Federation Republic of
Nigeria, 1999, § 1(3).
59. Judge Meron has observed that: “[n]ational legal systems are characterized by a wellestablished hierarchy of norms. Constitutional provisions prevail over ordinary statutes, the latter
prevail over secondary legislation or administrative regulations, and so on. It is therefore only
natural that international lawyers, trained in national legal systems, should seek hierarchical
principles in the international legal system as well.” See Francisco Forrest Martin, Delineating a
Hierarchical Outline of International Law Sources and Norms, 65 SASK. L. REV. 333, at 333(2002)
(citing Theodor Meron, On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights, 80 AM. J. INT’L L. 1,
3(1986)).
60. Article 38 I.C.J, Statute provides that:
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considered as a hierarchy,61 yet an argument has been made against this
view. This argument contends that the itemization in Article 38 does not
create a hierarchy because all international norms are of equal status as
they all originate from the will of States.62 What Article 38 does show is
that international law is premised on State consent.63 This view echoes
the voice of voluntarists—those who believe that international law is tied
to the sovereign power of States.64 The hierarchy of the sources of law
should not be less important in international law than in domestic law,
especially in a regime of international law that has witnessed a growth of
“international
instruments,
tribunals,
and
quasi-adjudicative
intergovernmental bodies that decide different issues of international
law.”65
In this debate, much attention has been given to the relations of treaties
and custom.66 This attention does not suggest that treaties have no
relation to other sources of law, or that those other sources are not
important in the determination of international law matters. In fact, all
the sources of international law are interrelated. For example, a treaty
may codify a custom.67 It is contended that treaty provisions can give rise
to custom operating between two countries68 or among a host of

1.

The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes
as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law.
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono,
if the parties agree thereto.
See Statute of the I.C.J., art 38, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/
index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0.
61. See Harlan Grant Cohen, Finding International Law: Rethinking the Doctrine of Sources,
93 IOWA L. REV. 65, 77 (2007) (characterizing Article 38 ICJ Statute as a rough hierarchy,
notwithstanding the fact that it does not elevate one source over any of the other sources).
62. See Shelton, supra note 56, at 291 (citing PIERRE-MARIE DUPUY, DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC 14- 16 (1995)).
63. See Bing Bing Jia, The Relations Between Treaties and Custom, 9 Chinese Journal of
International Law [CHINESE J. INT'L L.] 81, 84 (2010).
64. See DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 13, at 57.
65. See Martin, supra note 59, at 335.
66. See generally Jia, supra note 63.
67. E.g., the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is to a great extent considered as a
codification of customary law. See DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 13, at 124.
68. The ICJ has held that such custom would only constitute a “a local custom” binding only
the parties, and not a general custom of international law. See Right of Passage (Port. v. India) 1960
I.C.J. 6 (Apr. 12).
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countries.69 Also, although the ICJ is not bound by its earlier decisions,70
it does cite its previous judgments for statements on customary law and
treaty law in the majority of the cases it decides. Notwithstanding these
observations, the battle of supremacy between treaty and custom rages
on.71 It underlies the view that treaties and custom are the two major
sources of international law.72
A remarkable thing about the struggle for supremacy between treaty and
custom is that it also exposes the inherent flaw in the argument
concerning the non-existence of a hierarchy of sources. In the early
formations of international law, custom was assigned a primary place in
the hierarchy of sources of international law while treaties were relegated
to the background.73 However, it remains doubtful whether custom has
maintained that primacy in the current regime of international law. The
fact that Article 38 of the ICJ Statute places treaties74 first in the list of
the sources may be an indication that treaties now have primacy over the
other sources of law.
Further, the appeal of treaties lies in the certainty that they create in law.
At a time when what constitutes custom gives rise to a big controversy
between developed and developing States, for instance with regard to
what standard of treatment is to be accorded foreign investment, the only
way to resolve or avoid the controversy is for States to conclude treaties.
In so doing, States would agree to, and clearly express in writing, the
terms governing their relations. In acknowledging the advantage of
certainty in treaties, the doyen of international law has noted that the
proliferation of treaties has continued to make treaties one of the most

69. E.g., following the signing by many states of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, U.S.
President Clinton asserted that the combined signatures a majority of countries, including the nuclear
powers of the world, would establish an international norm prohibiting nuclear testing. See
DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 13, at 89-90.
70. This is because there is no doctrine of binding precedent in international law. See
NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 12, at 102- 103.
71. See Oscar Schachter, Entangled Treaty and Custom, in ED DINSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY 717, 720-22 (1974).
72. See Lt. Col. Vincent A. Jordan, Creation of Customary International Law by Way of
Treaty, 9 U.S.A.F. JAG L. Rev. 38, 39 (1967) (citing 1 GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 26 (4th ed. 1960).
73. See Cohen, supra note 61, at 79. See also 1 L. Oppenheim, International Law 25-27 (8th
ed. 1955) (considering custom as the older and original source of international law).
74. Art. 38 uses “conventions”, which is one of the terms that can be used synonymously with
treaties. For other names by which treaties are called, see U. O. UMOZURIKE, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 163 (3rd ed. 2005).
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important sources of law, thus diminishing the status of custom as a
source of international law.75
The elevated position of treaty as a source of law has been brilliantly
captured by a celebrated scholar, Christopher J. Borgen:
While other sources of law such as customary international law
are no less juridically important than treaties, treaties occupy a
place of privilege in any discussion of the state of international
law. For example, the Treaty Handbook, published by the United
Nations (UN), states that “[t]reaties are the primary source of
international law.76
Borgen’s observation is apposite to the view of this paper.
Apart from the sources of law contained in Article 38, there are other
sources from which international law may emanate. However, these
sources are the subject of controversy. For instance, there has been a
debate as to the law-creating power, and by implication the bindingness,
of United Nations General Assembly resolutions. While some writers
think that General Assembly resolutions are law-making acts, and that
the principles contained in them represent international custom by virtue
of their being evidence of opinio juris,77 others have relegated them to the
status of “soft law” that have no binding effect.78 While General
Assembly resolutions on their own are merely advisory and have no
binding effect, their political importance should not be overlooked.79
However, to this extent, it is doubtful that General Assembly resolutions
constitute a real source of international law.
75. See UMOZURIKE, supra note 68, at 16. This point should not be taken to mean that
customary international law has lost its relevance as a source of international law. Rather the
position here is that treaties, as written products of long bargaining and negotiation between two or
more states, which are at least in principle considered equal, they tend to present much clarity and
reduce the doubt and uncertainty that sometimes attend customary international law.
76. See Christopher J. Borgen, Resolving Treaty Conflicts, 37 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 573,
n. 1 (2003).
77. See SORNORAJAH, supra note 9, at 82.
78. See Ioannis Lianos, The Contribution of the United Nations to the Emergence of Global
Antitrust Law, 15 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 415, 431 (2007) (observing that, “[t]he language of the
[UN] Charter, the travaux préparatoires of the San Francisco conference, and the practice of the
United Nations and that of its member states lead the majority of authors to conclude that ‘the
general powers granted to the [General] Assembly under those Articles do not involve binding
decision-making except where it is specially so provided expressly or by implication.’”) (citing
Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, The Normative Role of the General Assembly of the United Nations and the
Declaration of Principles of Friendly Relations, in 137 RECUEIL DES COURS: COLLECTED COURSES
OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 419, 444-45 (1974)).
79. See Yoav Tadmor, The Palestinian Refugees of 1948: The Right to Compensation and
Return, 8 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 403, 415 (1994).
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The weight given to the resolutions of the United Nations Security
Council in terms of law-creation seems to vary from that accorded to
General Assembly resolutions. Even though Security Council resolutions
are not generally considered legislation,80 some are considered to have
legal effect.81 These are usually decisions as opposed to
recommendations,82 and their binding nature must not be in conflict with
the principles and purposes of the United Nations.83 There is also an
argument that the Security Council is clothed with law-creating power,
giving its resolutions a binding character. This view is predicated on
Article 24 of the UN Charter. Under Article 24, member States confer to
the Security Council the power to act on their behalf in the maintenance
of international peace and security.84 This grant of power can be thought
of as an indication that member States accept that Security Council
resolutions are binding on them.85 Security Council resolutions have
acquired much potency over the years, to the extent that they may be
considered a source of international law, though their character may
differ from the other sources of law contained in Article 38 of the ICJ
Statute.
This paper subscribes to the view that there is a hierarchy of international
law sources. This position is fortified by the fact that even though States
have the right to contract out of general international law, they cannot do
so to jus cogens norms. This prohibition rests on the notion that jus
cogens are so fundamental to the existence of international law that they
limit the substance of valid treaties;86 in fact, they cannot be usurped by
treaties.87 They are sacrosanct and non-derogable – permitting derogation
only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same
80. This does not overshadow the view that considers the Security Council as the world's
legislator. See generally Eric Rosand, The Security Council as “Global Legislator”: Ultra Vires or
Ultra Innovative?, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 542 (2005).
81. See Michael C. Wood, The Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions, 2 MAX PLANCK
Y.B. U.N. L. 73, 79 (1998).
82. See Marko Divac Oberg, The Legal Effects of Resolutions of the UN Security Council and
General Assembly in the Jurisprudence of the ICJ, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 879, 884 (2006) available at
http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/16/5/879.full.pdf+html.
83. Id., at 885.
84. See UN Charter, art. 24.
85. See Rosand, supra note 80, at 574.
86. See Karen Parker, Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights, 12 HASTINGS INT'L
& COMP. L. REV. 411, 415-16 (1989).
87. Jus Cogens norms have been described as “norms that command peremptory authority,
superseding conflicting treaties and custom.” See Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary
Theory of Jus Cogens, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 331 (2009). Examples of jus cogens include the
prohibition against torture, slavery, genocide, piracy, and the use of force. See Dean Adams, The
Prohibition of Widespread Rape As a Jus Cogens, 6 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 357, 360 (2004-2005).
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character.88 This prohibition reflects an indication that there is a form of
hierarchy of sources of international law, of which jus cogens is the apex.
This may be considered a hierarchy of two layers of law: jus cogens and
the other sources. This hierarchy may not be read from the provision of
Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, but it is deduced from state practice, which
considers peremptory norm as non-derogable norm. It is only in respect
of the foregoing discussion about jus cogens that custom trumps treaty as
a source of law.
III. TREATY-MAKING IN CURRENT INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT REGIME
An international regime is described as consisting of “...principles,
norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors'
expectations converge in a given area of international relations.”89 The
relations arising from the conclusion of a treaty amount to international
relations and thus, could be part of an international regime. To this end,
the rules contained in international investment treaties do give rise to a
regime. The present international investment regime is made up of about
3,000 bilateral investment treaties90 and about 300 regional agreements
that provide for both trade and investment promotion.91 The emergence
of the current treaty regime has continued to provoke some issues and
debate among writers. This section discusses some of those issues,
namely 1) investment treaties as customary law constitutive or as special
law, 2) bilateral investment treaties versus multilateral investment
treaties/instruments, and 3) a seeming legitimacy crisis.
A. INVESTMENT TREATIES AS CUSTOMARY LAW CONSTITUTIVE OR
AS SPECIAL LAW
The most debated issue in the current treaty regime is perhaps the
characterization of investment treaties i.e. whether the provisions of
investment treaties constitute customary international law or only have
special application to the parties involved. Considering their
applicability, investment treaties have been considered as constituting
customary international law on the ground that their provisions manifest
certain concepts like the treatment of investments and aliens. These
concepts are representative of general principles of law and when states
88. See The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 53, May 23, 1969, 115 U.N.T.S.
331 [hereinafter VCLT].
89. See Stephen Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as
Intervening Variables, in STEPHEN KRASNER, POWER, THE STATE, AND SOVEREIGNTY: ESSAYS ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 113 (2009).
90. See Salacuse, supra note 53, at 427.
91. See Jose Alvarez, A BIT on Custom, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 17, 20 (2009).
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enter into investment treaties, they tend to incorporate them into their
domestic laws.92
Along this line of reasoning, at least two scholars have asserted that
investment treaties have risen to a level of custom. F. A. Mann, a major
commentator, asserted that investment treaties create customary
principles of international law and that States which have claimed to
reject these principles have come to embrace them when those States are
in critical situations.93 Professor Andreas Lowenfeld, while opining that
general public international law is impacted upon by investment treaties,
has asserted that although not all states are parties to the numerous
investment treaties, the non-parties to these treaties may now be bound
by some of the international investment principles arising from the
treaties.94 He maintains that the substantive investment protections
espoused in bilateral investment treaties have attained the status of
customary international law and therefore cannot be seen as lex
specialis.95 Much of the vigor of his argument derives from the decisions
of investment arbitrators, which decisions, he claims, coincide with
general international law and are therefore non-treaty based.96 Moreover,
he argues, when States conclude treaties, they do so on the understanding
that they are reproducing the customary international law rule in the
treaty and also recognizing its effect.97
On the other hand, it has been vigorously posited that investment treaties
contain special rules that are only applicable to the parties and that
treaties only bind States that have consented to them as a general
principle.98 Thus, investment treaties are considered lex specialis in that
they bind only the parties and operate on a quid pro quo basis. They do
not give rise to customary law, even where they involve several States.99
They therefore do not have a general acceptance.100 Moreover, in many
cases they involve unequal parties. For example, consider a situation
where a poor State, in its desperation for capital for development and
92. See Salacuse and Sullivan, supra note 28, at 115.
93. See F.A. Mann, British Treaties for the Promotion and Protection of Investment, 52 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 241, 249-51 (1981).
94. See generally Andreas Lowenfield, Investment Agreements and International Law, 42
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 123- 129 (2003).
95. Id. at 129.
96. Id. at 130.
97. See Davis Robinson, Expropriation in the Restatement (Revised), 52 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
241, 249 (1981).
98. See VCLT, supra note 88, art. 34.
99. See M. Sornarajah, State Responsibility and Bilateral Investment Treaties, 20 J. WORLD
TRADE 79, 82 (1986).
100. See SUBEDI SURYA, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: RECONCILING POLICY AND
PRINCIPLE 103 (2008).
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without sufficiently appreciating what impact a particular treaty would
have on its economy, resignedly concludes a treaty with a developed
country. In this scenario, such treaty—a product of unequal bargaining
power—cannot reflect customary law.101 If the contents of investment
treaties differ markedly, then it would be baseless to conclude that they
produce generally acceptable rules.
The major problem in approaching this debate lies in identifying what
principles qualify as international custom sufficient to constitute
international law. A determination of what amounts to custom in
international law lacks certainty. Although a number of approaches have
been put forth,102 the issue still lacks much clarity. A number of treaties
may make reference to general principles of international law in their
provisions, but such reference in itself does not give a clue as to what
principles the parties generally agree to be customary international law in
their investment regulations. There has been a consistent disagreement
between developed and developing States as to what standard of
investment protection reflects an international law standard.
For instance, while the developed States have considered the Hull
formula as the international minimum standard recognized by customary
law for the protection of investments,103 the developing States have
consistently rejected this standard as representing general custom. As a
result of this general rejection, developing States have secured the
formation of the New International Economic Order within the United
Nations.104 Therefore, it cannot be said that the prompt, adequate, and
effective compensation standard put forth in the Hull formula has the
stamp of international custom.
101. See Jason Webb Yackee, Pacta Sunt Servanda and State Promises to Foreign Investors
Before Bilateral Investment Treaties: Myth and Reality, 32 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1550, 1552 (2009).
102. See the Paquete Habana, 175 U.S 677 (1900) and the Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.) P.C.I.J. (Ser. A)
No. 10 (1927). It has been suggested that the ability of a party to a treaty to show that the treaty leads
to the formation of a customary rule or that such a rule predates the treaty, is a way of determining
the existence of a custom. See Anthony D' Amato, Treaties as a Source of General Rules of
International Law, 3 HARV. INT'L BULL. 1, 32 (1962). Kensen sees custom as the acceptance by
states of certain practice, through whatever form of consent. See HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 311 (1952). It has also been suggested that customary law can be derived
from “individual actions undertaken by the legal person and spontaneously repeated by other legal
persons, until their repetition becomes so constant that they will also in similar circumstances, be
repeated in the future.” See TORSTEN GIHL, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION, 25 (1957).
103. The Hull formula embodies the “prompt, adequate, and effective compensation.”
104. G.A. Res. 3201, U.N. GAOR, 6th Spec. Sess., Supp. 1, 2229th pln. mtg., at 3, U.N. Doc.
A/9559 (1974). The New International Economic Order is a program that was adopted by the United
Nations to improve the economic conditions of developing States relative to the developed States. It
was a product of the demands of developing countries to effectively participate in the decisionmaking of international financial bodies. See Enrique R. Carrasco & M. Ayhan Kose, Income
Distribution and the Bretton Woods Institutions: Promoting an Enabling Environment for Social
Development, 6 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 11-12 (1996).
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This is notwithstanding the fact that States can act upon certain
provisions of treaties to the extent that a consistent practice is established
between them which attains the status of a special custom. The ICJ has
considered that special custom as “a local custom,” is binding as between
the States and not a general custom of international law.105 The position
would appear that treaties may reflect general customary law, but not the
detailed contents. For example, the rule that every act of expropriation by
a State engages its responsibility to pay compensation is a custom that is
recognized in all investment treaties. But, investment treaties do not
provide a generally accepted standard for determining the amount of
compensation.
Unlike other fields of international law, such as human rights where the
prohibition of torture, slavery, and other acts has clearly been established
to constitute international custom, in the area of investment treatymaking, a general consensus on what practice amounts to customary
international law has been elusive in the field of international investment
law.
B.

BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES VERSUS MULTILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATIES

One remarkable feature of the current investment regime is the
dominance of bilateral investment treaties and the lack of multilateral
investment treaties. As shown earlier in the evolution of international
investment treaties, because of the uncertainty and disagreements among
States as to what constitutes customary international law of investment,
the various attempts to establish multilateral treaties did not
materialize.106 This section discusses the apparent preference for bilateral
investment treaties in the status quo.
While there is a legal framework at the multilateral level to regulate
trade, no multilateral treaty has been developed to address international
investment.107 The lack of consensus on international investment law has
hindered the adoption of multilateral investment treaties. During the
World Trade Organization WTO Doha Round of negotiation, a proposal
made by the developed States to reach an agreement on a multilateral
105. On this note, the ICJ, in the Right of Passage Case, observed that: “It is difficult to see why
the number of states between which a local custom may be established on the basis of long practice
must necessarily be larger than two. The court sees no reason why long continued practice between
two states accepted by them as regulating their relations should not form the basis of mutual rights
and obligations between the two states.” See Right of Passage, supra, note 68.
106. See M. SORNORAJAH, supra note 9, at 236.
107. See Efraim Chalamish, The Future of Bilateral Investment Treaties: A De facto
Multilateral Agreement?, 34 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 303, 307 (2009).
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investment treaty was rejected by the developing States on the premise
that the conclusion of such a multilateral treaty would impinge on the
sovereign powers of the developing States.108 The progress that has been
achieved in international investment law consists in bilateral investment
treaties and regional agreements and instruments on investment.109
While States have shown an unwillingness to form multilateral treaties
on investment, they have consistently adhered to bilateral investment
treaties. The result is that bilateral investment treaties continue to enjoy
more popularity than multilateral investment treaties.110 One reason for
this disparity is the fact that the negotiation and conclusion of a bilateral
treaty is far easier to achieve than that of a multilateral treaty. While a
bilateral treaty caters to the interests of only two States, a multilateral
treaty deals with the interests of many countries.111 Moreover, developed
States, considering their superior economic power over developing
States, are more eager to conclude bilateral treaties with the latter than to
enter into multilateral treaties where other developed States may
challenge their primacy. However, developed States are willing to
conclude bilateral treaties with developing States so that they can obtain
investment liberalization.112 This willingness seems to arise from
developed States’ knowledge that the developing States would undertake
little to no investment in the developed States. Developed States have
been hesitant to conclude bilateral treaties with other developed States
because of their apprehension that these other developed States may pose
strong competition to the host countries.113
Bilateral investment treaties have not been balanced in the way they
benefit the parties, that is, developed States and developing States.
Perhaps the conclusion of multilateral treaties will offer balanced
investment relations among the parties since such treaties will involve
108. See Fiona MacMillan, If Not This World Trade Organization, Then What?, 2 INT'L CO. &
COM. L. REV. 75, 76-79 (2004).
109. E.g., the ASEAN Treaty on the Protection and Promotion of Investments, Dec. 14, 1987,
27 I.L.M. 612 (1987) and the European Energy Charter Treaty, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 360 (1995) and the
North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec 17, 1992, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993)
(hereinafter NAFTA).
110. It has been asked rhetorically: “…why is it that multilateral agreements concerning
international investment or multinational enterprises are impossible to achieve, while bilateral
investment agreements multiply like fruit flies?” See Lowenfeld, supra note 94, at 123.
111. See Calvin A. Hamilton & Paula I. Rochwerger, Trade and Investment: Foreign Direct
Investment through Bilateral and Multilateral Treaties, 18 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 1, 28 (2005); FEN
OSLER HAMPSON, MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS: LESSONS FROM ARMS CONTROL, TRADE AND
THE ENVIRONMENT 1-51, 345-60 (1995).
112. See generally, Ryan Suda , The Effect of Bilateral Investment Treaties on Human Rights
Enforcement and Realization, Hauser Global Law School Program,Global Law Working Paper
01/05.
113. See Kelley, supra note 55, at 494-98.
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many actors in the investment arena who may constitute a check on the
excesses of the more powerful States. However, these balanced
investments relations would exist only if similar occurrences under the
international trade regime – where developed States would not let go of
some of their dominating tendencies – would not be replicated under
multilateral investment treaties.
C.

A SEEMING LEGITIMACY CRISIS

Another feature of the present international investment regime in terms
of treaty-making is the institution of arbitration as a means of settling
investment disputes. There is a general assumption that like cases will be
treated the same way and should produce the same outcome as similar
cases previously decided. In other words, it is expected that the tribunals
that decide investment disputes brought to them by parties to treaties
should interpret treaty provisions that have similar content consistently.
This reflects the practice of precedent which is not uncommon in
international law and which has been observed by the ICJ and arbitral
bodies.114 However, contrary to this expectation, inconsistent decisions
have continued to spring up from the tribunals.115 This section discusses
the concern that is generated by inconsistent arbitral decisions.
The explosion in the number of treaties has resulted in a comparable
surge in investment disputes. Arbitral tribunals, in a bid to deal with
these disputes, do make inconsistent decisions. These awards, when
given, provoke reactions from both the States which are affected by the
awards and academics. The result is that a sort of legitimacy crisis is
created in the current international investment law regime.116 Notably,
“[s]cholars have argued that inconsistent decisions by arbitral tribunals
threaten the legitimacy of the system.”117 This observation leaves the
meaning of the legitimacy crisis at large. If it implies that the tribunals,
by virtue of their inconsistent awards, lose the legitimacy reposed on
them by the treaty parties, then this may not be correct.

114. See NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 12, at 102.
115. See Eric Gottwald, Leveling the Playing Field: Is It Time for A Legal Assistance Center
for Developing Nations in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 22 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 237, 256-59
(2007) (arguing that “in several instances investment treaty tribunals have come to different
conclusions over the meaning and application of” the major investment treaty standards “even when
confronted with the same set of facts,” and that this is not unconnected to the open-ended language
used in drafting these key provisions).
116. See Stephan W. Schill, W(h)ither Fragmentation? On the Literature and Sociology of
International Investment Law, 22 EUR. J. INT'L L. 875, 894-96 (2011).
117. See Yackee, supra note 101, at 1556.
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Given the fact that the tribunals presiding over investment disputes
derive their authority from the provisions of the treaty itself, it is
questionable whether the international investment regime suffers a
legitimacy problem as a result of inconsistent decisions of the tribunals.
To this extent, the use of the expression “legitimacy crisis” may be a
misnomer, because legitimacy is derived from the terms of a treaty
consented to by the sovereign authority of the contracting States. At
most, inconsistent decisions may affect the competence of the tribunals,
not the legitimacy of the investment regime. The problem of inconsistent
decisions may not be peculiar to investment tribunals; rather, it seems to
affect other dispute settlement mechanisms.
For instance, under municipal systems adjudicatory bodies may render
inconsistent decisions, and several reasonable explanations for
inconsistent awards exist. Inconsistent awards can occur in different
ways. A scholar, Franck, identifies three major ways inconsistent arbitral
awards arise. First, different tribunals can arrive at different conclusions
when ruling on the same standard in the same treaty.118 Second, different
tribunals selected under different treaties can give different rulings in
respect of disputes with the same facts, related parties, and similar
investment rights.119 Third, different tribunals selected under different
treaties may arrive at opposing conclusions in respect of disputes with
similar facts and similar investment rights.120 In the Launder Arbitrations,
two arbitral tribunals arrived at different decisions regarding two cases
that were constituted essentially of the same merits.121 Inconsistent
decisions make it difficult for host States to clearly understand the nature
and extent of their commitments under investment treaties.122 They also
reveal the problem of treaty interpretation in international investment.
To address this problem of consistency, tribunals should always be
guided by the rules of treaty interpretation. Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties describes the central tenet to these
rules: “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context
and in the light of its object and purpose.”123 When the “ordinary
meaning” is not helpful enough, one should resort to interpretation aides,
118. See Franck, supra note 23, at 1545- 1546.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1546.
121. Id. at 1559-68 for the facts of the cases and the rulings in these cases.
122. See Kelley Connolly, Say What You Mean: Improved Drafting Resources As A Means for
Increasing the Consistency of Interpretation of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 40 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1579, 1595 (2007).
123. See VCLT, supra note 88, art. 31(1) and id. at 1579, 1589.
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including presumptions and travaux prepartoires124 because they offer
some insight into a treaty’s background. Aside from the foregoing points,
the problem of inconsistent arbitral awards can be addressed by adding
more transparency to treaty arbitration125 and by establishing a system
that would enable a dissatisfied party to challenge an arbitral award –
appealing the award so that another tribunal may review the award.126
Such an appellate system can be created by the prior agreement of the
parties under the foreign investment treaty. A system similar to what is
suggested here is contemplated under the investment related provisions
of the United States – Chile Free Trade Agreement which under Annex
10-H permits the parties to consider whether to establish a bilateral
appellate body to review certain arbitration awards.127 Arbitral awards
can also be reviewed by domestic courts,128 but such judicial exercise of
appellate power has been criticized for placing issues of investment
disputes within the realm of national sovereignty rather than within
international law.129 It has been suggested that there be an appellate
mechanism similar to the Appellate Body of the WTO Dispute
Settlement Understanding that would be responsible for reviewing
arbitral decisions arising from investment disputes.130 However, the call
for an increased transparency to treaty arbitration should be mindful of
the confidentiality requirement of arbitration, otherwise the parties'
willingness to enter into arbitration may be eroded.131 In any case, minor
structural changes could provide a means of better consistency in arbitral
awards.

124. See NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 12, at 111-13. Travaux prepartoires are “a record
of negotiations preceding the conclusion of a treaty…”. They are the drafting history of a treaty. See
Marylin J. Raisch, Travaux Preparatoires and United Nations Treaties or Conventions: Using the
Web Wisely, 30 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO 324, 325-26 (2002).
125. See Connolly, supra note 122, at 1596.
126. See id., at 1596 and Franck, supra note 23, at 1546-55. Also, see generally Erin E.
Gleason, International Arbitral Appeals: What are We Afraid of?, 7 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 269
(2007) (arguing for arbitral appeals in investor-state arbitration).
127. See David A. Gantz, The Evolution of FTA Investment Provisions: From NAFTA to the
United States- Chile Free Trade Agreement, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 679, 762 (2004) (quoting
Annex 10-H, United States- Chile Free Trade Agreement, Jun. 6, 2003: “within three years after the
date of entry into force of this Agreement, parties shall consider whether to establish a bilateral
appellate body or similar mechanism to review awards rendered under Article 10.25 in arbitrations
commenced after they establish the appellate body or similar mechanism’’).
128. For instance, in United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corporation, after losing an arbitral
case filed against it by a United States Investor, Mataclad, Mexico appealed to the Supreme Court of
British Columbia against the award by the tribunal established under NAFTA. See J.C. Thomas, A
Reply to Professor Brower, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 433,434 (2002) (citing United
Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp. (2001), 89 B.C.L.R. (3d) 359; [2001] B.C.J. 950).
129. id (citing Charles H. Brower II, Investor-State Disputes under NAFTA: The Empire Strikes
Back, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 43, 46 (2001).
130. See, generally, David A. Gantz, An Appellate Mechanism for Review of Arbitral Decisions
in Investor-State Disputes: Prospects and Challenges, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 39, (2006).
131. See Connolly, supra note 122, at 1597.
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As this section has shown, there is need for investment tribunals to yield
consistent decisions in disputes that essentially share similar facts since
“[a]ny system where diametrically opposed decisions can legally coexist
cannot last long.”132 This consistency will solve the seeming legitimacy
crisis identifiable in the current international investment regime.
IV. THE GENERAL BINDINGNESS OF TREATIES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
One of the cornerstone rules of international law is that the provisions of
a treaty are legally binding on the parties to it, and such parties are
required to fulfill their treaty obligation in good faith. This rule is known
as the principle of pacta sunt servanda133 which has been described by the
International Law Commission as “the fundamental principle of the law
of treaties.”134 This section will examine the pacta sunt servanda
principle.
The underlying philosophy behind pacta sunt servanda is the idea that “it
is proper for individuals to be bound by their promises.”135 Accordingly,
the continuity of contractual relations is achieved.136 Additionally,
international relations are enhanced when States, in their dealings with
each other, have the comfort and assurance that whatever agreement they
enter into will be respected by each party. Thus, pacta sunt servanda is
trust-constitutive.137
The history of the principle of pacta sunt servanda spans a long period of
time. In fact, the principle had been featured in the writings of ancient

132. See Franck, supra note 23, at 1583.
133. This is codified in Article 26 of the VCLT, which provides that “[e]very treaty in force is
binding on the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.” See VCLT, supra note 88,
art. 26.
134. See U.N. Int’l L. Comm’n, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its
Eightieth Session, UN Doc A/6309/Rev.1, (reprinted in U.N., 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 172, 211
(1965) (cited in Alicia Triche Naumik, International Law and Detention of US Asylum Seekers:
Contrasting Matter of D-J- with the United Nations Refugee Convention, 19 Int'l J. Refugee L. 661,
666 (2007)).
135. See Richard Hyland, Pacta Sunt Servanda: A Meditation, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 405, 406
(1994) (quoting RENE DAVID, LES CONTRATS EN DROIT ANGLAIS, ¶ 101, (2d. ed. 1985)). The
obligation to keep promises, in turn, is founded on the maintenance of confidence and bonds of trust.
See C. Scott Pryor, Consideration in the Common Law of Contracts: A Biblical-Theological
Critique, 18 REGENT U. L. REV. 1, 27 (2006).
136. See Kevin H. Anderson, International Law and State Succession: A Solution to the Iraqi
Debt Crisis?, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 401, 402 (2005).
137. See Emily K. Penney, Is that Legal? The United States' Unilateral Withdrawal from the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 1287, 1305 (2002).
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scholars like Hobbes, Aquinas, and Von Martens.138 More recently, other
scholars like Ancilotti, Kelsen, and Verdross have given some
consideration to pacta sunt servanda which they view with some
unanimity as the basic norm of international law.139 The principle has
also been recognized by some Christian writers who have viewed it from
a theological prism.140 For example, Calamiri and Perillo link the history
of pacta sunt servanda to Christian thinking.141 Pacta sunt servanda is also
reflected in religious texts. The Bible contains an admonishment, “thou
shall keep thy word”142 – a command that captures the essence of the
pacta sunt servanda rule. Likewise, the Qu'ran contains a similar order,
which commands all believers to fulfill obligations.143 This rule is so
important in international law that it has attained the status of jus
cogens.144 It is considered to be an international constitutional law upon
which the international legal system is built145 and a “subject of
unsurpassed international consensus.”146 The pacta sunt servanda
principle has a great implication on domestic law in that a State may not
invoke the provisions of its municipal law to justify its failure to perform
a treaty obligation.147
Not only does it exist as a legal norm, but pacta sunt servanda is also a
requirement of ethics.148 The principle applies to all treaties, whether
concluded under public international law or private international law.149
138. See J. Logan Murphy, Law Triangle: Arbitrating International Reinsurance Disputes under
the New York Convention, the McCarran—Ferguson Act, and Antagonistic State Law, 41 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1535, 1557 (2008).
139. See Jianming Shen, The Basis of International Law: Why Nations Observe, 17 DICK. J.
INT'L L. 287, 402-03 (1999). Similarly, it has been noted that “international law and treaties derive
their legitimacy from the international norms of sovereign equality and the rule of pacta sunt
servanda.” Jason D. Flemma, The Case for the Repeal of Congressional Legislation That Places
Conditions on Sovereign States Participation in International Organizations, 2 J. INT'L BUS. & L.
174, 180 (2003).
140. See Henricus de Segusia (Cardinal Hostiensis), Lectura in quinque libros decretalium
gregorianarum, 1, de arbitris 9.6 Venice (1581); Samuel Pufendorf, De jure naturae et gentium libri
octo (James Brown Scott ed., C. & W. Old-father trans., photo. Reprint, 1934) (1688) (cited in
Pryor, supra note 135, at 20-21, (notes 78, 79).
141. See Pryor, supra note 135, at 23.
142. Numbers 30: 2 (King James). See also K.M. Sharma, From “Sanctity” to “Fairness”: An
Uneasy Transition in the Law of Contracts? 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 95, 97 (1999).
143. Sura Al-Maida 5:1. See also Sharma, supra note 142, at 98.
144. See Shen, supra note 127, at 341-42.
145. See Dinesh D. Banani, International Arbitration and Project Finance in Developing
Countries:Blurring the Public/Private Distinction, 26 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 355, 369 (2003).
146. Id., at 374. According to the Third Restatement, pacta sunt servanda is perhaps the most
important principle of international law. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW,
§ 321, cmt. a (1987).
147. See VCLT, supra note 88, art. 27.
148. See Hyland, supra note 135, at 406.
149. Although the VCLT applies to only states, and also makes the conclusion of treaties the
exclusive preserve of states, the capacity to enter into treaties is no longer reserved to states alone.
For example there is currently an instrument on the conclusion of treaties between states and
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Thus, the contention that the principle has traditionally been applied in
public international law, but not in private commercial law,150 may be
greeted with some objection. This push back is because the principle of
pacta sunt servanda is also recognized under domestic law,151 and it has
been applied to ordinary contracts and concession agreements.152
Underlying the principle of pacta sunt servanda is the concept of consent.
Thus, when a State has expressed its consent to be bound under a treaty
relation, it may not do anything that would compromise that obligation.
However, it is not merely the consent that binds the State but the legal
system that makes it mandatory for a State not to dishonor its consensual
obligation.153 Thus, Professor Shen asserts that without such a legal
system, every agreement a State concludes would be meaningless and
non-binding.154
Pacta sunt servanda has also been recognized in many cases by
adjudicatory bodies. In a case between the United States and Great
Britain, the Permanent Court of Arbitration expressed the view that the
obligation to observe the provisions of a treaty precludes a state from
enacting a law that conflicts with a provision of a treaty to which it is a
party.155 The ICJ, in determining the binding nature of unilateral
declarations in the Nuclear Tests case, observed that good faith
constitutes one of the primary principles governing the creation and
performance of legal obligations.156 Similarly, is the principle featured in
international organizations or between two or more international organizations. See generally U.N.,
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or
Between International Organizations, vol. II, Mar. 21, 1986, (U.N. publication, Sales No. E.94.V.5)
available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_2_1986.pdf.
150. Banani, supra note 145, at 374.
151. See John K. Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International
Relations Theory and International Law, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 139, 160 (1996).
152. See Libyan American Oil Company v Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 62 I.L.R.,
140 (1977) (Liamco arbitration). In this case it was noted that the bindingness applies to not only
individuals, but governments as well. (cited in Michael E. Dickstein, Revitalizing the International
Law Governing Concession Agreements, 6 Int'l Tax & Bus. Law. 54, 72 (1988)).
153. See Shen, supra note 139, at 325.
154. Id.
155. See the North Atlantic Fisheries (Gr. Brit. v. U.S.), 11 R.I.A.A. 167, 188 (Perm. Ct. Arb.,
Sept. 7, 1910).
156. See Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 268 (Dec. 20); also available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4023a57c7.html. In an earlier case—Gabcikovo-Nagymaros
Project, the ICJ, in holding that a bilateral treaty concluded in 1977 between the parties was still in
force and that both parties were under a legal obligation to observe its provisions, further observed
as follows: “What is required in the present case by the rule pacta sunt servanda, as reflected in
Article 26 of the Vienna Convention of 1969 on the Law of Treaties, is that the Parties find an
agreed solution within the co-operative context of the Treaty. Article 26 combines two elements,
which are of equal importance. It provides that 'Every treaty in force is binding on the parties to it
and must be performed by them in good faith.' This latter element, in the Court's view, implies that,
in this case, it is the purpose of the Treaty and the intentions of the parties in concluding it, which
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the judgment of the ICJ in a territorial dispute case between Libya and
Chad.157
The principle of pacta sunt servanda has given rise to some issues,
among which is what a State should do when it finds itself in two treaties
with conflicting provisions, each calling for observance. This situation
may be caused by a lack of foresight by the State authorities responsible
for concluding treaties on behalf of the State. It could also be a product
of a deliberate act or bad draftsmanship. Although the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties contains a provision for resolving
conflicts in treaties in Article 30,158 the provision is not so elaborate as to
apply to or resolve all cases of treaty conflict. For example, its
application is limited to conflicts with respect to treaties of the same
subject matter.
Also, Article 30 fails to recognize the implication of the bilateralmultilateral treaty dichotomy on the issue of treaty conflicts.159 To
should prevail over its literal interpretation. The principle of good faith obliges the Parties to apply it
in a reasonable way and in such a manner that its purpose can be realized”. See GabcikovoNagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997, I.C.J. 7, ¶ 139.
157. See Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad) (Territorial Dispute Case)
(Judgment), 1994 I.C.J. Reps 6. After Libya's independence in 1951, the Treaty of Friendship and
Good Neighborliness between France and Libya was concluded in August 1955 which inter alia,
purported to recognize the frontier between Libya and French Equatorial Africa, the predecessor to
Chad, which became independent in 1960. Article 3 of the treaty inter alia, provided that the parties
“recognize that the frontiers” between the territories of French Equatorial Africa and the territory of
Libya “are those that result from the international instruments in force on the date of the
constitution” of Libya. Libya argued that the treaty was not a boundary treaty. The I.C.J. held that
Article 3 of the treaty gave rise to a legal obligation, which the parties must honor. See generally
Malcolm D. Evans, International Court of Justice: Recent Cases, 44 Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 683,
(1995).
158. See VCLT, supra note 88, art. 30, which provides that:
1. Subject to Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations, the rights and obligations of
States Parties to successive treaties relating to the same subject matter shall be
determined in accordance with the following paragraphs.
2. When a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered as
incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the provisions of that other treaty prevail.
3. When all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the later treaty but the earlier
treaty is not terminated or suspended in operation under article 59, the earlier treaty
applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the later
treaty.
4. When the parties to the later treaty do not include all the parties to the earlier one:
a. as between States Parties to both treaties the same rule applies as in paragraph 3;
b. as between a State party to both treaties and a State party to only one of the treaties,
the treaty to which both States are parties governs their mutual rights and
obligations.
5. Paragraph 4 is without prejudice to article 41, or to any question of the termination or
suspension of the operation of a treaty under article 60 or to any question of
responsibility which may arise for a State from the conclusion or application of a treaty
the provisions of which are incompatible with its obligations towards another State
under another treaty.
159. See Borgen, supra note 76, at 580- 581.
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illustrate this dichotomy, in some situations parties may conclude a treaty
without including a provision that would determine what would happen
if that treaty conflicted with a preexisting or a future treaty to which any
of the parties is or may become a party. Therefore, when a conflict
results at least one of the parties would be breaching its obligation in at
least one of the treaties.160 It would be prudent for each State to not
conclude a treaty that conflicts with its existing treaty obligations161 and
for States to adopt drafting techniques that would adequately address
cases of conflicting treaties.162 These precautionary measures would help
bring harmony in the relations of States.
Another issue borders on the extent to which pacta sunt servanda applies
when there is State succession. This dilemma brings to limelight the
continuity-tabula rasa debate in matters of State succession.163 Supporters
of the two sides of the debate have resorted to their respective grounds to
back their positions,164 thus leaving the debate vexed. The Vienna
Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties has stepped in
to offer some resolution to the issue,165 yet the much-desired resolution

160. Id. at 575 (observing that a conflict situation arises “when a state is party to two or more
treaty regimes and either the mere existence of, or the actual performance under, one treaty will
frustrate the purpose of another treaty”).
161. Recently, Nigeria signed a Bilateral Immunity Agreement with the United States under
which it agreed not to hand over any citizen of the United States to the International Criminal Court
or any authority for prosecution without reference to the United States. See Agreement Between the
Government of the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Nigeria Regarding the
Surrender of Persons to the International Criminal Court, done at Abuja, June 30, 2003, art. 4,
available at http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/guides/documents/Nigeria03-138.pdf. It is noteworthy
that Nigeria is currently a party to the Rome Statute which establishes the International Criminal
Court. Consequently, the Agreement between the United States and Nigeria violates Nigeria's
obligation under the Rome Statute. The United States has signed agreements of similar nature with
other states.
162. See Borgen, supra note 76, at 634-37.
163. Under the theory of continuity, otherwise known as universal succession, a state is
considered as having a continuous legal personality and existence, and so does not change even if it
separates into one or more parts. In relation to the principle of pacta sunt servanda, this doctrine
implies that a successor state automatically inherits, and continues with, the treaty obligations of the
predecessor state. See Andrew M. Beato, Newly Independent and Separating State's Succession to
Treaties: Considerations on the Hybrid Dependency of the Republics of the Former Soviet Union, 9
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 525, 537 (1994). On the other hand, the tabula rasa doctrine absolves a
new state of the treaty obligation of the predecessor state. This is founded on the view that state
succession is an attribute of sovereignty. To this extent, the tabula rasa theory appears to be
antithetical to the pacta sunt servanda principle. See Anderson, supra note 136, at 407 and
UMOZURIKE, supra note 75, at 177.
164. See International Law Association, Interim Report of the Committee on the Succession of
New States to the Treaties and Certain Other Obligations of their Successors, in International Law
Association Report of the Fifty Second Conference, 584 (1966). See also Note and Comment,
Revolutions, Treaties, and State Succession, 76 YALE L.J. 1669, 1678 (1967).
165. Some of the major provisions are Arts. 8, 9, 15, 16, 17, 28, 34. See Vienna Convention on
Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, Aug. 23, 1978, 1946 U.N.T.S. 3.
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seems to have remained at large. This lack of a resolution has continued
to affect the application of the principle of pacta sunt servanda.
International investments are governed by general international law.
Thus, pacta sunt servanda, being a principle of international law, equally
applies to investment treaties. States, when concluding an investment
treaty, do so with the understanding that the treaty is legally binding on
them. Even without the treaty expressly stating so, the general
assumption is that except in certain circumstances, the provisions of an
investment treaty are legally binding on the host State and the
international investor.
Traditionally, and ever since foreign investors acquired the capacity to
institute cases against sovereign States before international tribunals,166
the principle of pacta sunt servanda has grown to receive considerable
recognition and enforcement with regard to international investment.167
However, there is a claim to the contrary, though not well supported by
current events in the investment arena. The principle of pacta sunt
servanda received some external challenges in the era of the New
International Economic Order from the movement for the establishment
of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources168 which led to the
adoption of the 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.169
During this movement, developing States challenged the principle of
pacta sunt servanda when espousing the economic sovereign rights
contained in the 1974 Charter.170 But it would not be incorrect to state
that, despite this alleged antagonism toward the pacta sunt servanda
principle by developing States, the bindingness of treaties has continued
to endure, and tribunals have always espoused it.

166. See Yackee, supra note 101, at 1574-75 (citing the 1930 arbitration between Lena
Goldfields, Ltd. (a British concessionaire) and the Soviet Union as one of the earliest cases involving
foreign investors and foreign states. In that case Lena successfully challenged the Soviet Union's
unilateral repudiation of the concession of agreement between the two parties.).
167. See id. at 1578-83.
168. See G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), U.N Doc. A/5217 (Dec. 14, 1962).
169. G.A. Res. 3281, supra note 36, art. 2 (granting every state the right to regulate and exercise
authority over foreign investment within its territory, and to nationalize such foreign investment).
170. See generally Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining
the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639 (1998). Daniel E. Vielleville &
Baiju Simal Vasani, Sovereignty over Natural Resources Versus Rights under Investment Contracts:
Which One Prevails?, 3, available at http://www.crowell.com/documents/Sovereignty-Over-NaturalResources-Versus-Rights-Under-Investment-Contracts_Transnational-Dispute-Management.pdf,
(noting that developing states argued that their sovereignty over natural resources prevailed over any
contractual agreement entered into by them).
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EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL BINDINGNESS OF
TREATIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

Just like many other international law rules, the rule requiring States to
perform their treaty obligations in good faith is not sacrosanct. In other
words, there are circumstances under which treaties may be invalidated
or terminated, thereby excusing a party from performing its obligations
arising from the treaty.171 Any analysis of treaty obligation must therefore
proceed from the presumption of the enforceability of treaties, until a
rebuttal is established.172 This section presents rebus sic stantibus,
conflicts between treaty and jus cogens, and odious debt as some of the
possible rebuttals to the pacta sunt servanda principle.
A.

REBUS SIC STANTIBUS

The principle law governing treaties, the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, has a number of provisions concerning when parties to a
treaty may not be bound by its provisions.173 Central to these exceptions
is what has come to be known as the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus. Even
before the coming into effect of the Vienna Convention, rebus sic
stantibus was already part of then existing international law.174 The
doctrine envisions a fundamental change in circumstances underlying the
treaty that makes it impossible for the treaty objectives to be pursued.
However, for such a change of circumstances to be validly invoked, the
underlying circumstances must have been essential to the parties' consent
under the treaty and their effect must be so weighty as to transform the
future performance of the treaty obligation.175 Therefore, mere economic
hardship is not sufficient to found a change of circumstances as
envisaged by the exception.176 The operation of the doctrine seems to be
dependent on the parties' actual or subjective non-foreseeability of the
occurrence of those circumstances changing.177 The question here is not
whether the parties ought to have foreseen the occurrence of those
changed circumstances, but whether they did in fact foresee them.178 The

171. See VCLT, supra note 88, part V.
172. See R. Y. Jennings, State Contracts in International Law, 37 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 156, 177
(1961).
173. See generally VCLT, supra note 88, part V.
174. See Detlev F. Vagts, Rebus Revisited: Changed Circumstances in Treaty Law, 43 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 459, 466-69 (2005) (tracing state practice on rebus sic stantibus to 1969).
175. See VCLT, supra note 88, art. 62(1).
176. See Dickstein, supra note 152, at 76.
177. See Damien M. Schiff, Rollin', Rollin', Rollin' on the River: A Story of Drought, Treaty
Interpretation, and Other Rio Grande Problems, 14 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 113, 140 (2003).
178. Id., at 140.
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successful invocation of the exception leads to a termination or
suspension, rather than a revision of the treaty.179
The doctrine of rebus sic stantibus may be vague180 and it may prove
problematic to determine what circumstances are fundamental to trigger
the successful application of the exception.181 Because of these
vulnerabilities, there is risk of abuse of the doctrine or of its use in bad
faith. It is because of this risk that some writers have viewed rebus sic
stantibus with much distrust, and there is a looming controversy over the
approach to the doctrine.182 One school of thought is that the exception is
subjective in nature, implying that it applies on a treaty-to-treaty basis. In
other words, it takes into cognizance the express and implied conditions
of a treaty that certain circumstances are to remain unchanged.183 The
other school of thought takes an objective position, arguing that rebus sic
stantibus is resident in every treaty and can be invoked once there is a
fundamental change of circumstance.184 By this postulate, rebus sic
stantibus need not be expressed in the terms of the treaty.185 There seems
to be yet another view that takes a middle ground – mixing the subjective
and the objective approaches. Draetta and others have stated that rebus
sic stantibus is to be considered objectively, taking into consideration the
intent of the parties.186
Unfortunately, Article 62 of the Vienna Convention, which contains a
provision on rebus sic stantibus, fails to clearly state what the effects of
the changing circumstances would be on the performance of the treaty in
terms of “impracticability” or “impossibility”187—two terms that are used
in contract law to refer to possible but exceptionally burdensome
179. See UGO DRAETTA, RALPH B. LAKE, & VED P. NANDA, Changed Circumstances
and Contract Adaptation, TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, § 4:64 (2011).
180. See Setear, supra note 151, at 172.
181. In recognition of this problem, Schiff notes that “[t]he challenge lies in keeping states from
reducing an implied escape clause to a mere diplomatic cover for the abandonment of inconvenient
promises.” See Schiff, supra note 177, at 139.
182. Id., at 141 (mentioning some of the writers who view the doctrine with some objection).
183. See Malcolm E. Wheeler, Toward the Peaceful Modification of Treaties: The Panama
Canal Proposals, 21 STAN. L. REV. 938, 950- 951 (1969).
184. Id., at 951.
185. Id., at 951. Even though it is generally difficult to determine what amounts to a
fundamental change of circumstances, the application of this objective approach may make it more
difficult to make such determination. One question that may be asked, even if hypothetical is, what
would be the effect on this objective view of rebus sic stantibus if parties to a treaty include an
express term in the treaty that the treaty would be enforceable in every situation? In other words, will
this objective view prevail over the express intention of the parties?
186. See DRAETTA, LAKE, & NANDA, supra note 165, at § 4:64 (citing A. VAMVOUKOS,
TERMINATION OF TREATIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW—THE DOCTRINES OF REBUS SIC STANTIBUS
AND DESUETUDE 214-16 (1985).
187. Article 62 merely talks of the effect as “...radically to transform the extent of obligations
still to be performed” under the treaty. See VCLT, supra note 88, art. 62.
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performance and clearly impossible performance respectively.188
However, the effect of Article 61 of the Vienna Convention is that the
occurrence of a supervening event can discharge a party from its
obligation under a treaty only if the event makes it impossible for the
treaty to be performed.189 Therefore, this interpretation of Article 61
implies that an impracticability of performance is not a defense under the
Vienna Convention.
It should also be noted that that rebus sic stantibus may not avail a party
pleading it if the fundamental change is occasioned by a breach by that
party of an obligation under the treaty or of any other international
obligation.190 In other words, a party may not hide behind the rebus sic
stantibus exception when that party breaches its treaty obligation and
then turns around to contend that the circumstances upon which the
treaty was concluded have changed, thereby relieving it of its treaty
obligation. Furthermore, the exception may not be invoked where the
treaty establishes a boundary.191 In other words, when parties establish a
boundary by treaty, the agreed upon boundary has a “degree of

188. See Schiff, supra note 177, at 149. Rebus sic stantibus has been considered similar to
doctrines of frustration, hardship, and imprevision, in domestic law. See DRAETTA, LAKE, &
NANDA, supra note 179, at § 4:64. ("Imprevision prevails as an efficient legal instrument in solving
legal situations having contractual origins, determined by a drastic and unpredictable change of the
economic circumstances at the moment of executing the contract as compared to the date of its
conclusion by the contracting parties. As for its domain of application, imprevision occurs in
contracts with pecuniary obligations. The conditions of imprevision are the following: the obligation
becomes excessively onerous as a result of a change in contractual circumstances, the moment of the
changes in circumstances must be ulterior to the conclusion of the contract, the unpredictability of
the change of circumstances at the moment of concluding the contract, the risk determined by a
situation of imprevision shall not be within the category of risks that the debtor has undertaken at the
moment of concluding the contract or that arise from the nature of the contract." (available
at http://fiatiustitia.ro/ojs/index.php/fi/article/view/14)). However, it should be noted that there is a
divergence in the application of these doctrines. Vagts has noted some of the differences between the
application of the treaty doctrine of rebus sic stantibus in international law and the application of
frustration in domestic law with respect to contracts. See Vagts, supra note 174, at 465- 466. One of
such differences is that, since treaties are a product of long and deliberate bargaining- a feature that
may be lacking in the conclusion of commercial contracts under municipal law, it is less common for
treaty parties to contend that they did not contemplate the happening of a contingency when
concluding the treaty. Secondly, while the performance of a contract can be frustrated by a new
legislation, no similar occurrence may be witnessed under international law with respect to treaties,
except when the Security Council of the United Nations slams a sanction on a state and calls on
other states to suspend relations with that state; or when there is an emergence of a jus cogens
rendering a treaty illegal, which emergence tends to be highly improbable. See Schiff, supra note
177, at 149.
189. See VCLT, supra note 88, art. 61.
190. Id., art. 62(2)(b).
191. Id., art. 62(2)(a).
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permanence and outlives the treaty.”192 In the words of the ICJ, the object
of such treaty is to secure “stability and finality.”193
Even though rebus sic stantibus is considered an appropriate exception to
pacta sunt servanda,194 in recent years its application has met little or no
success. Michael Dickstein, an international law scholar, has noted, “…
no international tribunal up through 1981 had ever relied on [the
exception] either in cases involving treaties or concession agreements.”195
This fact is despite the recognition of the exception as a major principle
of international law196 and as representing customary law.197 While there
have been a handful of cases where the exception was invoked and was
rejected,198 tribunals show more inclination toward applying the doctrine
as a mitigation of damage than to exonerate parties from breach.199 The
paucity of cases upholding the defense of rebus sic stantibus could be an
indication that courts and tribunals show deference to the bindingness of
treaties. This deference ensures that a party does not renege on its
promise under a treaty and guards against a party's use of the exception
in bad faith. In addition, the deference seems to refute the concerns of
some writers that the exception would be abused. In the interpretation
and application of rebus sic stantibus, an overriding consideration should
be given to the ultimate object of the treaty.
B.

CONFLICT WITH JUS COGENS NORM

Another circumstance that can constitute an exception to the general
bindingness of treaties is when a treaty is in conflict with a jus cogens
norm.200 The conflict may either be in respect of an existing norm or a
new norm.201 In the case of conflict with an already existing peremptory
norm, the situation may be considered as involving a rule of invalidity.
This is because such treaty, ab initio, would be considered void, perhaps
192. See Evans, supra note 157, at 688.
193. Id., at 687.
194. See Anderson, supra note 136, at 403.
195. See Dickstein, supra note 152, at 78.
196. Kuo-tung Yang, A Study of Treaty Abrogation and the Principle of Rebus Sic Stantibus in
International Law, 2 CHINESE (Taiwan) Y.B. INT'L L. & AFF. 308, 309 (1982).
197. See Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K. v Ice.) 1973 I.C.J. 3 and UMOZURIKE, supra note 75,
at 171.
198. E.g., Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, 1932 P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 46
and Oscar Chinn (U.K. v. Belg.) 1934 P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 63 and Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v.
Ice.), supra note 197, and Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), supra note 156.
199. See Dickstein, supra note 152, at 79.
200. See VCLT, supra note 88, art. 53 (defining a peremptory norm of general international law
(jus cogens) as “...a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character”).
201. See UMOZURIKE, supra note 75, at 171.
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implying that the treaty never had a binding force in the first place.
However, characterizing a treaty that conflicts with an existing
peremptory norm as void ab initio may not be entirely correct in view
that “acts performed in good faith before the invalidity was invoked are
not rendered unlawful only by reason of the invalidity.”202
The jus cogens exception appears to be external to the intention or
conduct of the parties, in that it brings to an end the treaty relations of the
parties even if the parties have been cooperating with regard to their
obligation under the treaty or are willing to continue their treaty
relations.203 The willingness of such parties to continue with their treaty
obligation is of no consequence since the treaty has become contrary to
international law.204 Jus cogens norm has been identified as safeguarding
the interest of the international community, rather than the interests of
the individual states.205 It is therefore expected of States to not derogate
from them when entering into treaties. In fact jus cogens are not capable
of being set aside by treaty or acquiescence of parties.206 With the
controversy surrounding the concept of jus cogens, it may be problematic
to determine when this exception applies.207
C.

ODIOUS DEBT

Another possible exception to pacta sunt servanda is odious debt. Issues
of State debts form an important aspect of pacta sunt servanda,208
especially with regard to State succession. The question is whether, and
to what extent, a successor State has an obligation to assume the debts of
its predecessor State. Although discussions on State succession with
regard to State debts tend to adopt a general position of automatic
succession as a starting point, the weight of this view is reduced by the
contrary arguments of many writers.209 The Vienna Convention on
Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts
202. Id., at 171.
203. See Setear, supra note 151, at 210.
204. See L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 555 (1909) (remarking that : “Just
as treaties have no binding force when concluded with reference to an illegal object, so they lose
their binding force when through the progressive development of International Law they become
inconsistent with the latter”).
205. See Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Impact of Peremptory Norms on the Interpretation and
Application of United Nations Security Council Resolutions,16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 59, 62 (2005).
206. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 513 (3d. ed. 1979).
207. See Setear, supra note 151, at 168.
208. State debts are debts that are not attributable to private individuals or entities, and which a
state may owe another state, an international organization, a publicly owned or privately owned
financial institution, or a private person. See DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 13, at 1541.
209. See Jeff A. King, Odious Debt: The Terms of the Debate, 32 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
605, 609-14 (2007) (presenting the opposing views).
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has some provisions governing the obligation or otherwise of a successor
State to repay the debts incurred by the predecessor State.210 However,
these provisions may not reflect customary international law, because the
Convention itself does not enjoy a general acceptance by States211 and is
not in force presently.212
State debts presuppose that a State incurs a financial obligation for the
general benefit of the State or its citizens.213 Thus, central to State debt is
the “public benefit” element. Where this objective is lacking, such debts
may amount to what is known as odious debts and may constitute an
exception to pacta sunt servanda. Thus, Nahum Sack, who has been
described as the world's pre-eminent legal scholar on public debts,214
pungently stated that:
When a despotic regime contracts a debt, not for the needs or in
the interests of the state, but rather to strengthen itself, to
suppress a popular insurrection, etc, this debt is odious for the
people of the entire state. This debt does not bind the nation; it is
a debt of the regime, a personal debt contracted by the ruler, and
consequently it falls with the demise of the regime.215

210. E.g., Article 37 provides that in the case of a transfer of part of the territory of a state by
that state to another state, the public debt of the predecessor state shall pass to the successor state by
agreement. In the absence of an agreement, such public debt shall pass in equitable proportions.
Article 38 is to the effect that a newly independent successor state has no obligation to repay the
public debt of the predecessor state unless there is a special agreement between them, and such
agreement shall be in accordance with peoples' right over their wealth and natural resources. Article
39 provides that when two or more states unite to form a successor state, the debt of the predecessor
states is borne by the successor state. According to Article 40, when there is separation of part or
parts of a state, in the absence of an agreement, debt shall pass in equitable proportions. By the
provision of Article 41, when a state dissolves and ceases to exist, absent an agreement, debt of the
predecessor state shall pass to the successor states in equitable proportions. See Vienna Convention
on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts, adopted in Vienna, Apr.
6, 1983. See also U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 117/14, 22 I.L.M. 306 (1983).
211. See Paul Williams & Jennifer Harris, State Succession to Debts and Assets: The Modern
Law and Policy, 42 HARV. INT’L L. J. 355, 360 (2001) (citing Eli Nathan, The Vienna Convention
on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts, in DINSTEIN, supra note
71, at 493).
212. For the status of the Convention, visit http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/
MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20III/III-12.en.pdf.
213. See Williams & Harris, supra note 211, at 360-61 (stating that state debts are divided into:
national state, territorial debt, and local debt).
214. See Emily F. Mancina, Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God: Resurrecting the Odious
Debt Doctrine in International Law, 36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 1239, 1246 (2004).
215. See A.N. Sack, Les Effets de Transformations des Etats sur Leur Dettes Publiques et
Autres Obligations Financieres (Paris: Recueil Sirey, 1927) (quoted in Rachel Ordu, Debt and the
Realization of Economic and Social Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa: Beyond Debt Relief to Solutions
in the Common Interest, 3 Intercultural Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 229, 251 (2008).
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Even though the Vienna Convention is silent on odious debt, the concept
has come a long way in the history of state relations.216 The odiousness of
a debt is established when three basic elements are present, namely: (1)
an absence of popular consent; (2) an absence of benefit; and (3) creditor
awareness of these two elements.217 Odious debts are capable of
interfering with developing countries' ability to provide the basic human
rights of their citizens. When a State incurs a private debt that is not in
the interest of the citizens and then uses the State resources to service
such debt, there is a likelihood that this will deplete the means available
to cater to the basic needs of the populace.218 Part of the debts owed by
poor countries has been considered as odious.219 Applied to pacta sunt
servanda, the implication is that when odious debts form an obligation
under a treaty, the pacta sunt servanda principle becomes inapplicable
because the new State is thought not to be bound by the debt incurred for
the private benefit of the predecessor State.
A review of the international precedents does not show that a definite
position has been taken in respect to the doctrine of odious debts. In the
dispute between the United States and Spain220 - which took place after
the former wrestled from the latter the task of administering Cuba –
Spain demanded that the United States be responsible for the repayment
of Cuba's debt to Spain.221 The United States countered this demand on
the basis that, although the debt was borrowed on behalf of Cuba, neither
was the debt in the interest of the Cuban people nor was it with their
authorization.222 Rather, the debt was for the benefit of Spain223 and
imposed upon the Cuban people by force of arm.224 In such
circumstances, the United States argued, “the creditors, from the
beginning, took the chances of the investment.”225 It seems no mention
was made of odious debt.

216. For the history of the doctrine, see Christoph G. Paulus, Odious Debts vs. Debt Trap: A
Realistic Help?, 31 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 83, 84-85 (2005).
217. See King, supra note 209, at 608.
218. See Chris N. Okeke, The Debt Burden: An African Perspective, 35 INT'L LAW 1489, 1495
(2001).
219. Id., at 1505.
220. For brief facts on the dispute, see Joseph Hanlon, ‘Illegitimate’ Loans: Lenders, Not
Borrowers, Are Responsible, 27 Third World Quarterly, (No. 2) 211, 213 (2006), available at
http://www.open.ac.uk/personalpages/j.hanlon/3WQ_illegitimate_debt.pdf.
221. Id., at 213.
222. See Anderson, supra note 136, at 409.
223. Id. at 409.
224. See Hanlon, supra note 220, at 213.
225. Id. at 213.
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Similarly, in Tinoco Claims Arbitration,226 the Arbitrator did not make
any pronouncement on the status of odious debt or whether the doctrine
applied in that case.227 Great Britain had brought claims against Costa
Rica for acts of a previous regime in Costa Rica – the Frederico Tinoco
regime. The Arbitrator, United States Chief Justice William H. Taft,
ruled that a new regime inherits the debt of a past recognized
government.228 However, the tribunal set aside the debt that was incurred
by the Tinoco government on the ground that it was for the personal use
of Tinoco and the creditor bank was aware of this fact.229 Thus, it can be
argued that the concept of odious debt could be inferred from the reason
in support of the ruling.230
The problem with the concept of odious debts as an advocated exception
to pacta sunt servanda is that it does not seem to have a widespread
acceptance on the international plane. Unlike pacta sunt servanda, rebus
sic stantibus and other doctrines that have been codified, odious debts as
a concept has yet to earn a codification in international law.231 Further,
considering the fact that the majority of the debts that are considered
odious are owed by developing States to developed States, the issue
seems to assume a South-North controversy.
However, the arguments that are offered in the academic literature in
support of the non-bindingness of odious debts are sound arguments with
both moral and legal foundations. From a moral perspective, as has been
observed, perceiving odious debts as non-binding on the borrower, and
requiring the lender to be responsible for such debts can be a veritable
tool to discipline lenders and guard against future lending to oppressive
dictators.232 This will in turn cause creditors to ensure that money loaned
is used for the interests and needs of the State.233 In some jurisdictions,

226. See Tinoco Claims Arbitration (Gr. Brit. v. Costa Rica), (Opinion and Award of Williams
H. Taft, Sole Arbitrator), 1 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 369 (1923), as reproduced in DAMROSCH ET
AL., supra note 13, at 367-68.
227. See Mancina, supra note 214, at 1248.
228. An irony in this case was that the same Great Britain that brought the claims against Costa
Rica had not recognized the Tinoco Regime; yet Great Britain went ahead and concluded an oil
concession agreement with the Tinoco government. In fact, part of the argument of Costa Rica was
that Great Britain was estopped from bringing the claims given Great Britain's own non-recognition
of the Tinoco government. See Tinoco Claims Arbitration, supra note 226.
229. See Mancina, supra note 214, at 1247-48.
230. But the doctrine of odious debts appeared in Iran's argument before the Iran- United States
Claims Tribunal. The Tribunal did not make any definite pronouncement on the status of the
doctrine. Id., at 1247-48.
231. See Anderson, supra note 136, at 401.
232. See Hanlon, supra note 220, at 211.
233. See Joseph Hanlon, Defining Illegitimate Debt and Linking Its Cancellation to Economic
Justice, 6, available at http://www.kirkensnodhjelp.no/Documents/Kirkens%20N%C3%B8dhjelp/
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for instance under United States and English contract law, a creditor is
required to apply prudence when a making loan to some categories of
persons. Thus, when a loan is made to someone who lacks the capacity to
borrow, for instance, a severe drug addict or an insane person, the lender
loses the right to be repaid.234 This position has been extended to apply to
a very corrupt or inept regime to the extent that such a regime is
considered incompetent to borrow.235 In addition, the fiduciary
relationship between government and the people does not apply when a
corrupt regime is securing a loan for its own use. The government, for
purposes of such a loan, is not considered as a trustee of the people.236
Odious debt should therefore be universally accepted as an exception to
the bindingness of treaties.
VI. BENEFITS AND CRITICISMS OF INVESTMENT TREATIES
Investment treaties do come with some perceived advantages. On the
other hand, they have been subjected to criticisms. This section discusses
the benefits and criticisms of investment treaties.
A.

BENEFITS OF INVESTMENT TREATIES

Many benefits have been associated with the conclusion of investment
treaties. This section will consider three of those benefits: (1) the
promotion of investment; (2) investment protection; and (3) economic
liberalization.
Regarding the promotion of investment, it has been argued that by the
grant of national and reciprocal treatments and the elimination of
restrictions of capital and repatriation of profits, bilateral investment
treaties promote investment between the two countries.237 Developed
States, through the instrumentality of treaty-making, tend to facilitate the
entry and operation of investments by inducing the developing host
States to remove obstacles in their regulatory systems.238 Furthermore, in
the event that a developing State enacts a law that interferes with the
Publikasjoner/Temahefter/Defining%20illegtimate%20debt.pdf. (hereinafter Hanlon, Illegitimate
Debt).
234. See James W. Child, The Limits of Creditors’ Rights: The Case of Third World Debt, 9
SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 114, 119 (1992) (cited in Joseph Hanlon, Illegitimate Debt, supra, note 234,
at 10).
235. See Hanlon, Illegitimate Debt, supra note 233, 10-11.
236. Id.
237. See A.E.M. Maniruzzaman, Expropriation of Alien Property and the Principle of NonDiscrimination in International Law of Foreign Investment: An Overview, 8 J. TRANSNAT'L L. &
POL'Y 57, 71 (1998).
238. See Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Treatification of International Investment Law, 13 L. &
BUS. REV. AM. 155, 160 (2007).
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investment of the foreign investor, the foreign investor will force the host
State into arbitration.239 When investment is allowed to thrive without
unnecessary obstacles, development is achieved, improving the quality of
life of the nationals of the host State.
There seems to be an assumption that investment treaties require the host
State to create an enabling environment that is conducive to foreign
investment.240 But it seems government policies and local economic
conditions exert more influence on the decision of the investor to invest
in the host State than investment treaties. Thus, developed States tend to
conclude investment treaties only with those developing States whose
laws and policies offer sufficient protection, and are favorable to,
international investment.241 It has been the position of developed
countries that investment treaties enable developing countries to
liberalize their economies by allowing the entry of foreign investment
and the creation of conditions favorable to the operation of those
investments.242 This liberalization of developing States’ economies will
arguably lead to more economic successes – a first benefit of investment
treaties.
The second benefit of investment treaties is that they guarantee
investment protection. This is achievable by the provision of the standard
of treatment that the host country is expected to accord to the foreign
investment. Investment treaties serve as a means through which States
establish mechanisms for protecting the foreign investments of their
nationals against the adverse actions of the host States' governments.243
Developed countries perceive investment treaties as an avenue to foster

239. See Calvin Hamilton & Paula I. Rochwerger, supra note 111, at 21.
240. See Salacuse, supra note 53, at 450 (stating that “[t]he general premise of investment
treaties is that investment promotion is to be achieved by the host country’s creation of a stable legal
environment that favors foreign investment”).
241. See Kenneth Vandevelde, Investment Liberalization and Economic Development: The
Role of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 501, 523 (1998).
242. See Salacuse, supra note 238, at 160.
243. See K. Scott Gudgeon, United States Bilateral Investment Treaties: Comments on Their
Origin, Purposes and General Treatment Standards, 4 INT'L TAX & BUS. L., 105, 105 (1986). Thus,
in most bilateral investment treaties, there are, inter alia, provisions requiring the payment of
compensation by the host state in the event of expropriation, and obligating the host state to accord
the foreign investment “fair and equitable treatment,” or “full protection and security,” or “treatment
no less favorable than that required by international law.” There are also provisions against
unreasonable discrimination. See Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of Romania Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of
Investment, May 28, 1992, Art. III(1), S. Treaty Doc. No. 102- 136 (1992). See also Mohammed
Khalil, Treatment of Foreign Investment in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 7 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN
INV. L. J. 339, 351 (1992) and Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago Concerning the Encouragement and
Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Sept. 26, 1994, S. Treaty Doc. No. 104-114 (1995).
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increased protection of their property around the world.244 Another way
investment treaties protect foreign investment is by allowing the parties
to resort to an international legal framework, like arbitration, to resolve
any disputes arising from the investment relations.245 This dispute
resolution mechanism derived from the international legal framework
saves the investor from the precarious situation of solely relying on the
domestic law of the host state, which may offer little or no protection to
the foreign investor because the government of the host country may
have prejudice towards the investment or may interfere with the judicial
process.246 These increased protections encourage investment because
there is less risk to the investor.
A third benefit is that it is equally claimed that investment treaties ensure
economic liberalization by facilitating, as well as protecting the flow of
international investment, which would in turn yield economic
development.247 It is upon this premise that developing countries, by the
1980's, began to relax their hitherto restrictions on their economic
models and embraced a more liberal economic system, concluding
bilateral treaties with developed countries.248 These claims appear
bloated, considering that investment treaties take into account the special
laws of the host State regulating the entry of foreign investments,249 yet
may result in an investment treaty that may not guarantee an investor a
244. See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 28, at 76. The United States Trade Representative's
office recognized the goals of the United States Bilateral Investment Treaties Program to be the
protection of United States investment abroad, the encouragement and adoption in foreign countries
of policies that treat private investment fairly; and supporting the development of international law
standards that are consistent with the stated goals. See also Jeffrey Lang, Keynote Address, 31
CORNELL INT'L L. J. 455, 457 (1998).
245. See Matthews Saunders, Bilateral Investment Treaties Oil the Wheels of Commerce, in
LLOYD'S LIST INTERNATIONAL 6 (June 23, 2004).
246. The treaty practice that affords the private investor the right to take out an action against a
sovereign state before an international arbitration has been hailed as revolutionary, as such procedure
is absent in international trade law. See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra 28, at 88.
247. See Vandevelde, supra note 241, at 503-04.
248. See Jeswald Salacuse, From Developing Countries to Emerging Markets: A Changing Role
for Law in the Third World, 33 INT'L L. 875, 882-886 (1999). Economic principles claim that
production of goods and services will be at its peak when the market is fully entrusted in the hands
of demand and supply without any regulatory intervention by the government. See also GEORGE
CRANE & AMAL AMAWI, THE THEORETICAL EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY,
6-7, 55-58 (1997). However, this position is absolutist, and in reality, it is doubtful if there is any
state that adopts this extreme approach to economic liberalization. The principle of sovereignty
(which embraces economic sovereignty) still holds so much appeal in international law and
relations, to the extent that states have a latitude of powers to regulate, and in fact do regulate, the
operation of foreign investments within their territories. See ROGER CUMMINGS, UNITED STATES
REGULATION OF FOREIGN JOINT VENTURES AND INVESTMENT, IN INTERNATIONAL JOINT
VENTURES: A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO WORKING WITH FOREIGN INVESTORS IN THE U.S. AND
ABROAD 137, 139 (David Goldsweig & Roger Cummings, eds., 1990).
249. See e.g., Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Hung.U.K., Art. 2.1, Mar. 9, 1987, 1990 U.K.T.S. 44, reprinted in 4 ICSID Rev.-Foreign Inv. L. J., 159,
160 (1989).
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right of access to the host country’s market.250 The guarantees found in
most investment treaties do not apply at the pre-investment stage, but
after the establishment of the investment. At best, what is found in
investment treaties is an aspiration to attain economic liberalization.
However, if economic liberalization does yield economic benefit, then
the expressed aspirations in investment treaties is a benefit.
B.

CRITICISMS OF INVESTMENT TREATIES

Despite the benefits accruing from investment treaties, there are three
criticisms directed at investment treaties. One centers on the inequality
that exists between developed and developing States, especially in terms
of bargaining power. The second criticism concerns the high expenses
incurred by developing States in defending investment arbitration cases.
The third criticism is the coercion within which developing States are
forced into giving up concessions to the investor. These criticisms are
explored in this section.
Owing to economic inequality between developed and developing States,
the claimed benefits derivable from investment treaties tend to lean in
favor of the developed States.251 In fact, developing countries are often
compelled by developed countries into concluding bilateral investment
treaties.252 Investment treaties have also been criticized on the ground of
their cost implications on the host States in defending claims brought
against them by the foreign investors.253 Most foreign investors comprise
multinational corporations whose annual profits may be more than the
annual income of the host States. The host States are often developing
States with poor financial standing, resulting in arbitration claims that
may render the host States highly impoverished.254 There is the argument
that bilateral investment treaties engender competition that is unfair to
domestic investors but advantageous to the foreign investors255 and that
250. See Vandevelde, supra note 241, at 511.
251. See Duncan Williams, Policy Perspectives on the Use of Capital Controls in Emerging
Nations: Lessons From the Asian Financial Crisis and a Look at the International Legal Regime, 70
FORDHAM L. REV. 561, 614 (2001) and Horacio Grigera Naon, Sovereignty and Regionalism, 27
LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 1073, 1077-78 (1996).
252. See Ryan, supra note 8, at 79.
253. See Salacuse, supra note 238, at 160.
254. For example, the arbitration case between Big Food Group (BFG), a United Kingdom
corporation, and the South American country, Guyana, arising from a 1989 bilateral investment
treaty between United Kingdom and Guyana. See Magnus Saxegaard, Creditor Participation in the
HIPC Debt Relief Initiatives: The Case of Guyana, 32 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 725, 729-31 (2004).
See also Nick Mathiason, Business & Media: After 26 Years, UK Food Group Squeezes PovertyStricken Guyana for Pounds 12 Million, THE OBSERVER (London), Mar. 16, 2003, at 1.
255. See Vicki Been & Joel Beauvais, “The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA's Investment
Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International “Regulatory Takings” Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 30, 129 (2003).
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the international arbitration created under investment treaties is biased
against the host State.256
Another identifiable shortcoming with investment treaties is the reality
that, due to the desperation of the developing countries to attract
investment to their territories, with its claimed attendant economic
development, they tend to give up many concessions to the foreign
investors—the developed States. Thus, as a result of giving up
concessions, the general purposes of the treaties are defeated.257
Moreover, when compared with other types of agreements, the
negotiation, conclusion, maintenance, and renegotiation of investment
treaties can be more burdensome, especially on the poor, developing
countries.258
If the expenses developing States have to incur in order to conclude and
maintain investment treaties with developed States far exceed the
benefits they derive from such treaties, then it makes no economic sense
for developing States to maintain investment relations with developed
States. Considering the downsides of investment treaties, especially as
they impact developing States, the current investment regime should be
restructured to offer more benefits to the host States, which most times
are developing States.
CONCLUSION
The proliferation of investment treaties is evidence of advancement in
international investment. It also underlines society's efforts at getting
around its economic challenges. Investment treaties have to a large
extent reduced the uncertainties that were at the center of international
investment relations of the foreign investor and the host State in the past.
By negotiating and agreeing to the terms that would govern their
business relations, the parties to an investment treaty know from the
onset what obligations they owe each other, thereby reducing the
incidence of investment disputes.
256. See Olivia Chung, The Lopsided International Investment Law Regime and Its Effect on
the Future of Investor-State Arbitration, 47 VAND J. INT'L L. 958, 960 (2007).
257. See Sandrino, supra note 30, at 278, 297. See also Inaamul Haque & Ruxandra Burdescu,
Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development: Response Sought from International
Economic Law, 27 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 219, 252-53 (2004).
258. See Cheryl Gray & William Jarosz, Law and the Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment:
The Experience from Central and Eastern Europe, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 12- 13 (1995).
There is yet another criticism leveled against bilateral investment treaties, namely, that their dispute
settlement clauses do not permit the outcome of the arbitration to be accessible to the public. See
Scott Jablonski, Comment,!Si, PO! Foreign Investment Dispute Resolution Does Have a Place in
Trade Agreements in the Americas: A Contemporary Look at Chapter 10 of the United States-Chile
Free Trade Agreement, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 627, 654 (2004).
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In the absence of generally accepted rules of international law regulating
foreign investment, it becomes crucial that the foreign investor and the
host State come together and negotiate terms upon which their
transaction would be based. Under that arrangement, since States are
equal under international law in principle, they could bargain on terms
that would favor both parties. However, in reality, the so-called equality
of States does not operate in international investment, and in many
circumstances there is an asymmetry of bargaining power between States
that conclude treaties. This inequality affects the expectations of the
weaker party under the treaty. Assessing the current investment regime,
especially considering the number of investment disputes coming before
tribunals, yields an irresistible urge to doubt whether the evolution of
treaties has really solved the indeterminacy in the norms regulating
international investment. It would seem that the certainty guaranteed by
treaties is limited in scope because parties, in many situations, do not
really understand the provisions of the treaties they conclude. Moreover,
the conflicting decisions held by tribunals reflect that those tribunals too
do not really grasp the intricate provisions of the investment treaties.
Investment relations under international investment treaties are quite
complex, with clashes of interests between foreign investors and host
States. The rule that parties to treaties should observe their treaty
obligations in good faith seems to be a veritable means of addressing
these clashes. As is evident in State practice, tribunals strive to observe
the pacta sunt servanda principle, thereby ensuring that parties to
investment treaties do not act in a way that would defeat the objectives of
the treaties they conclude. The preparedness with which adjudicatory
bodies oppose attempts by parties to derogate from their treaty
obligations displays the commitment of such bodies to the bindingness of
treaties. However, in appropriate circumstances – especially when the
economic, environmental, health, and other concerns of the citizens of
the host State are adversely threatened – there is a need for tribunals to
apply the pacta sunt servanda rule with some flexibility as a State exists
for the welfare of its citizens. The example of Argentina is quite
illustrative here, where Argentina was subjected to several arbitrations
arising from a failure on its part to fully observe its treaty obligations due
to the country's financial crisis.259 South Africa faced A similar fate by
enacting the Black Economic Empowerment law to challenge the effect
of the apartheid policy that was in operation in the past.260 The

259. See M. SORNORAJAH, supra note 9, at 207.
260. For more information on the Black Economic Empowerment Law, see L.P. Krüger The
Impact of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) on South African Business: Focusing on Ten
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application of such flexibility would be done in a way that would
recognize the interests of the international investor. Resort by the host
State to conditions that have no basis as justifications for its derogation
from the treaty is deprecated and does not help in the development of
international investment.
As a primary source of international law, treaties occupy a principle
place among the sources of international law and international
investment. There is a hierarchy of international law sources, and treaty
seems to be second to none, apart from peremptory norms. Arguing that
there is an absence of hierarchy of international law appears to ignore the
trend of State practice. Numerous aspects of the interaction between
States are regulated by treaties. This development is not accidental, but
rather underscores the seeming ineffectiveness of other sources of law to
regulate the relations of States.
The current investment regime has not fared well. The dominance of
bilateral treaties over multilateral treaties implies that there is no strong
platform upon which multilateral states can pull their investment
potentials together for their mutual benefits. With developing States’
growing suspicion of developed States and the desire of the latter to
mainly enter into treaty relations with States they can dominate, the
future of multilateral investment treaties may remain bleak.
Investment treaties are of significant importance in the regulation of
foreign investment between the investor and the host State. However, the
negotiations of investment treaties as well as their provisions are grossly
in favor of the investor, to the disadvantage of the host, developing State.
Thus, the claimed benefits of international investment treaties are
exaggerated, and there is a need to offer more real benefits to the host
State under investment treaties.
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